Phenomenology of inclusiveness: ethical perspectives

Abstract

The Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the article attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its ethical perspectives toward an ethic that intends to be inclusive. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis. Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of inclusion in the life-world, an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the live-world thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness, which is open, latent, included in the life-world, non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character.

Keywords

• phenomenology
• inclusiveness
• life-world
• complicity
• responsiveness