Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia (Dec 2015)
The "Material" and the "Mental" as Brain Constructs
Abstract
For most philosophers it is “inconceivable” that neural states could give rise to mind. However, as Nannini demonstrates, this argument is very weak, because modern physics is full of aspects that are radically opposed to conventional thinking. Furthermore, the qualia problem represents a pseudo-problem which arises, whenever we confound events in our phenomenal world (“actuality”) with events in the consciousness-independent world (“reality”). Everything we identify and measure as “material” brain structures and functions is a mental construct of a “real” brain inaccessible to us, and as such a mental construct it cannot be the true origin of mind. We have to accept that the alleged fundamental property differences of the material and the mental world are conventions of our mind. At the same time, we may hypothesize that “in reality” mind and consciousness are mental fields as emergent properties of cortical electromagnetic fields.
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