A unified model for the fairness mechanism‐based coordinated vehicle route guidance

Abstract

Abstract Coordinated vehicle route guidance is recognized as an effective way to alleviate the Braess' paradox that new congestion is generated since numerous vehicles obey the same guidance from Google Maps. In conventional route games, decision‐makers are assumed to be completely rational (maximized utility is taken as an optimization objective). However, behavioral research finds that not only the expected profit is pursued, but also the fairness psychology is concerned by decision‐makers in game theory. In existing studies, the fairness concern of players is widely accepted in supply chains. Inspired by the fairness psychology of supply chain members, the vehicle fairness coefficient is originally proposed in this paper. Moreover, a unified fairness mechanism of the routing game is built to perfect the existing theoretical framework of route games. Specifically, the formulated vehicle fairness coefficient is incorporated into the payoff functions of a perfectly rational‐based routing game, which makes the single‐objective problem to be multiple. Compared with the current completely rational‐based route games, this improvement allows vehicles to focus not only on travel time but also on route schemes' fairness. The consideration of vehicle fairness concern leads the original symmetric payoff matrix of the route game to be asymmetric. Since the existing solving theorems are not necessarily valid for the asymmetrical multi‐player game, a matched reinforcement learning algorithm is adopted to solve this new game. An experimental study shows that the averaged fairness coefficient is increased from 0.798 to 1.00 on the basis of the equal travel time due to the working of the designed fairness mechanism.

Keywords

• traffic management and control
• vehicle routing