Che cosa sono i gruppi sociali? Risposta ontologico-metafisica nella prospettiva dell’intero e delle parti

Abstract

The metaphysical question presupposes the ontological one: are there forms of social unit that can be recognized as real groups and, if so, what are they? The ontological answer can be affirmative only if we are able to identify real collective entities, that is, social wholes that are not reducible to the mere sum of their individual parts. Through an ontological comparison between different types of social interaction, this paper shows the ontological properties of a real collective subject. It is such, only if relations between its constituent parts generate an intrinsic normative structure, which gives existence to a higher order of social units. In this order members are bound to each other and are collectively bound to their group. They are bearers of collective intentionality. Their actions contribute to collective agency. Their responsibility is more complex and stratified than that of an independent individual. Moreover, all types of real wholes depend on ontological constitution processes, which give them the following: an intrinsic structural unit, a typological identity and emerging properties. The latter can be both new characteristics and new causal powers, which constituent parts do not have. Therefore, a right understanding of these ontological constitution processes is capable of overcoming reductionist isomorphism. It also offers the fundamental criterion for proposing a metaphysical theory that, being rooted in a rigorous ontology, is not an arbitrary exercise of imagination.

Keywords

• social ontology
• collective intentionality
• collective subjects