The Concept of De-Radicalization as a Source of Confusion

Abstract

The theme of the relationship between religious freedom and security has, over the last twenty years, acquired such centrality that hitherto unknown or little-used concepts have entered the public and specialized debates. Prominent among these is regarding the most concrete and important long-term public intervention in the fight against extremism on a religious matrix, i.e., de-radicalization, often simplistically understood as the opposite, or reverse, of a radicalization process. The activity of de-radicalization, therefore, must first be defined in its theoretical sense to grasp its real meaning and objectives; then, it is necessary to identify its content in practice, trying to understand its founding themes and limits. The risk of such a public intervention is interfering with the deepest sphere of the individual, with his or her religiosity and intentions, overstepping the limits derived from the different types of secularism (as Italian laicità or French laïcité) that characterize the State, requiring it to consider individual conscience as impassable territory. On the other hand, ignoring the intimate dimension of the subject can lead to complete ineffectiveness of a de-radicalization activity, which thus risks being reduced to a mere illustration of content. This contribution, starting from these difficulties, intends to outline, from a juridical perspective and specifically from a law and religion perspective, a hypothesis for a public de-radicalization strategy, capable of achieving concrete results but simultaneously respectful of the constitutional principles in which it is necessarily embedded, focused on the concept of responsibility.

Keywords

• de-radicalization
• radicalization
• freedom of religion or belief
• freedom of conscience
• <i>laicità</i>
• human dignity