CAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY REPLACE JUDGES IN DECIDING LEGAL MATTERS?

Abstract

The rapid development of artificial intelligence technology has led to predictions about the decline in the functions of many established professions, including that of the profession of judges. This paper questions whether such technology can substitute judges in deciding legal matters. Artificial intelligence technology assumes there are general patterns that will treat the same way for cases with similar characteristics (similia similibus). This view is not completely true because the judge's reasoning actually shows that each case tends to be approached independently (summun ius summa inuiria). Discretion is also required in the imposition of legal sanctions, and this does not fully capitalize on cognitive ability. There is the danger that artificial intelligence will reduce the values of humanity that actually want to be upheld in the judicial system. Artificial intelligence will also reduce the interpretation space in understanding the contextual meaning of a certain normative provision, so the legal text will become very rigid in its application. This paper is organised with a conceptual approach in which such an approach discusses some main concepts in legal reasoning that are closely related to the work of judges. In order to explain the relevance of these concepts, this paper introduces frameworks as a result of an effective literature review.