Silence in Argumentative Practices as a Manifestation of Tolerance

Abstract

The argument of silence as a manifestation of tolerance in the context of the problem of “familiarity and otherness” is represented in the article. The emphasis is put on future of empirical studies of argumentation. The informative, volitional and metallurgical functions of the argument of silence are shown through the examples of the group silence, namely the silence of the group of people present during the marriage ceremony in Christian and Muslim traditions. The differences in the role played by the argument of silence as a manifestation of tolerance in these traditions are defined. It is revealed that the distinguishing feature of the expression of the argument of silence in legal argumentative practices is the lack of measurable group tolerance since legal liability is always held by every individual as a subject of the delict. Here, the silence acts as a manifestation of tolerance as an agreement, acceptance, and protection of the point of view of another as one’s own. The article emphasizes the importance of the further improvement of the methodology of social groups argumentation, as well as the development of methods for determining group arguments as a type

Keywords

• silence as an argument
• functions of silence
• tolerance
• group tolerance
• argumentative practices