“The Death of Metaphysics” as Metametaphysics

Abstract

Over the years, many philosophers have proclaimed the death of metaphysics, the death of that area of philosophy concerned with the study of reality as such. But what exactly do they mean by this? What does this death-of-metaphysics idea imply? In this paper, I offer a way to articulate this idea by formulating it as a metametaphysical thesis about the non-substantivity of metaphysical claims. I argue that given this formulation such a metametaphysical thesis seems implausible. References Balog, Katalin. “In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84, (2012): 1-23. Chalmers David, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, eds. Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundation of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Chalmers, David. “Verbal Disputes.” The Philosophical Review 120, (2011): 475–513. Chalmers, David. “Ontological Anti-Realism,” in Metametaphysics, 2009, 77-129. Hirsch, Eli. “Quantifier Variance and Realism.” Philosophical Issues 12, (2002): 51-73. Jenkins, Carrie, “What is Ontological Realism?” Philosophical Compass 5, (2010): 880-890. Lowe, E. J. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Manley, David. “Introduction: A Guided Tour of Metametaphysics.” In Metametaphysics, 2009, 1-37. Shoemaker, Sydney. “Time without Change.” Journal of Philosophy 66, (1969): 363-381. Sider, Theodore. “Ontological Realism.” In Metametaphysics, 2009, 384-423.

Keywords

• Metametaphysics
• Metaphysical Realism
• Metaphysical Anti-realism
• “The Death of Metaphysics”