Flow Table Saturation Attack against Dynamic Timeout Mechanisms in SDN

Abstract

Software-defined networking (SDN) enables dynamic management and flexible network control by employing reactive rule installation. Due to high power consumption and cost, current OpenFlow switches only support a limited number of flow rules, which is a major limitation for deploying massive fine-grained policies. This bottleneck can be exploited by attackers to launch saturation attacks to overflow the flow table. Moreover, flow table overflow can occur in the absence of malicious attackers. To cope with this, researchers have developed many proposals to relieve the load under benign conditions. Among them, the dynamic timeout mechanism is one of the most effective solutions. We notice that when the SDN controller adopts dynamic timeouts, existing flow table saturation attacks can fail, or even expose the attackers, due to inaccurate inferring results. In this paper, we extract the common features of dynamic timeout strategies and propose an advanced flow table saturation attack. We explore the definition of flow rule lifetime and use a timing-based side-channel to infer the timeout of flow rules. Moreover, we leverage the dynamic timeout mechanisms to proactively interfere with the decision of timeout values and perform an attack. We conduct extensive experiments in various settings to demonstrate its effectiveness. We also notice that some replacement strategies work differently when the controller assigns dynamic timeouts. The experiment results show that the attack can incur significant network performance degradation and carry out the attack in a stealthy manner.

Keywords

• software-defined networking (SDN)
• OpenFlow
• saturation attack
• flow table overflow
• flow table management
• side-channel attack