Blasphemy laws contra defamation laws: An anomaly facing rational choice theory

Abstract

The standard rational choice theory is based on utilitarian grounds and, consequently, treats all preferences (utilities) as commensurable. Hence, it should treat substantive pain, that is, the loss of reputation/income resulting from defamation, as equivalent to dignity loss, that is, the loss of sense of worthiness/morale resulting from blasphemy such as slurs and insults. However, theory faces an anomaly: it cannot explain why those countries that enact defamation laws are hesitant enacting blasphemy laws. This paper solves the anomaly by finding that substantive pain, on the one hand, and dignity pain, on the other, are incommensurable. Substantive pain is definite, while dignity pain is context-dependent as it can be zero if the leveler of the insult is a child, an unstable person, or a person regarded of low-worthiness. Thus, we need to modify rational choice theory to account for the incommensurability between the two kinds of pain (that is, two kinds of utility) and, corollary, why defamation laws do not usually entail blasphemy laws.

Keywords

• Dignity loss vs. substantive loss
• Context-dependent preferences
• Substantive preferences (wellbeing)
• Dignity preferences
• Profanity
• Insults