El camino a la libertad. Eugen Fink y el principio de la fenomenología

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to show how the inner connection between phenomenology and freedom lies at the very heart of the phenomenological thinking of Husserl’s last assistant, Eugen Fink. His phenomenological conception is supported by a radicalization of a transcendental reduction conceived as world-transcensus, which not merely liberates the phenomenologizing thinker from his worldly prejudices, but also unlocks him to and for an absolute principle: the transcendental subjectivity and the constitutional consequences of the sense-giving, due to the autonomic force of the epoché. This transcending movement would therefore enable a transition from the naive partiality of the ‘natural attitude’ to the free impartiality of the “phenomenological attitude”. In this regard, the following considerations serve as a prolegomena to a theory of the phenomenological reduction as an act of freedom, and consequently to Fink’s idea of phenomenology as a philosophy of freedom.

Keywords

• Phenomenology
• freedom
• reduction
• epoché
• life-world