RUDN Journal of Philosophy (Oct 2024)
On Supervenience
Abstract
A logical formalization of the supervenience relation is proposed, allowing it to be presented as a logical, theoretical or factual relation between an individual property and another property, between an individual property and a set of properties, between two sets of properties. The main logical properties of these relations are characterized, an assessment of the known definitions of weak individual supervenience, strong individual supervenience and global supervenience associated with the concept of possible worlds is given from the standpoint of the proposed formalization. The difference between the understanding of the term "property" in classical predicate logic and the understanding of this term beyond it is emphasized. Possible interpretations of D. Davidson's thesis on the supervenience of mental characteristics on physical characteristics are considered. It is demonstrated that Davidson’s thesis does not correspond to any of the supervenience relations, the formalization of which was presented. An example of a scheme of an ideal hypothetically possible experiment is given, the results of which could refute the thesis on the supervenience of mental characteristics on physical ones. Arguments are put forward in favor of a skeptical position regarding the possibility of solving the problem of supervenience of the mental on the physical. Two types of possible situations are described in which supervenience of some properties on other properties can be discovered. It is shown that in situations of each of these types the supervenience relation is discovered as a consequence of some stronger type of connection, thereby revealing its secondary nature relative to the correlation dependencies between the properties (sets of properties) of the objects under study that are actually recorded in experience or theoretically substantiated. It is concluded that the significance of the idea of supervenience in analytical philosophy is overestimated.
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