On Empirical Necessity. Categorical, Dispositional Properties and the Laws of Nature

Abstract

There are two possible views of empirical necessity: theories of weak necessity and theories of strong necessity. The first category contains conceptions that consider the world to be composed of passive, categorical properties. According to such theories, changes in the world are the result of the laws of nature. Not only are the laws of nature different from one possible world to another, but the necessitation of those properties differs as well. The second category contains those philosophers who assume the existence of power active properties, dispositions. According to these theories, changes in the world result from the effects of those properties only, and in every possible world they have the same necessary manifestations. The author argues in favour of the existence of dispositional properties and claims that this dispositional interpretation of the world has no problems with the modal absurdities that affect theories of weak necessity. It is conceded that dispositional theories have their own problems and mainly some mysteries which could lead to the metaphysics of dispositional monads.

Keywords

• categorical properties
• dispositional properties
• laws of nature
• necessity
• modalities