Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (Nov 2021)

Schelling, Cavell, and the Truth of Skepticism

  • G. Anthony Bruno

DOI
https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i9.4919
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 9, no. 9

Abstract

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This paper argues that (1) McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because (2) Cavell rather regards terror as a mood that reveals the “truth of skepticism”, namely, that there is no conclusive evidence for necessary attunement on pain of a category error, and that (3) a precedent for McDowell’s misunderstanding is Hegel’s argument for necessary attunement in a system of knowing, whose refutation Schelling holds it is the “merit of skepticism” to provide.