Ostium (Mar 2020)
Perzistencia a identita osoby (Persistence and Personal Identity))
Abstract
The problem of personal identity is a well-known philosophical conundrum that depends on the presupposed contradiction between identity and change of a person. Identity is usually characterized by the requirements of sameness in qualities of a person. The change of a person is generally determined by the difference in the qualities of that person. Personal change is an empirically evident fact; therefore, some authors conclude that personal identity is just a human cognitive bias. This line of reasoning has some obvious merit. However, I do not think that we should abandon identity altogether. After all, if there is not any real identity of a person, then it is difficult to understand how a change of this person is possible. The solution to this paradox is simple, albeit metaphysically controversial. If we accept that a person can have temporal parts, then the change of a person is just a change in her different temporal parts. The identity of a person then depends on the unique sum of all her temporal parts, and the relation between these temporal parts is best described by the well-known theories of criteria of personal identity. We can have it both ways. Identity and change of a person are real, and the empirical criteria of personal identity are nontrivial and potentially valid for the debate about personal identity.
