Self-Responsibility and Responsibility for Others

Abstract

Because of the transcendent nature of the experience of my own self, responsibility for myself necessarily leads to responsibility for others. The aim of this paper is to approach this experience of the transcendence of the self and to show how it relates to a new sense of responsibility which transcends the self through a number of stages. First, the author outlines what might be called the "standard" view of authenticity in Husserl and how this particular view yields a certain view of responsibility as the ability to answer completely for "who" one is and "what" one does. Second, this standard view is challenged with another reading of the "self" in Husserl – one that emphasizes a necessary and productive division within the self. Thus, the author suggests that it is this second view of the self which is developed by Heidegger. Third, he demonstrates how this different view of the "authentic" self, that is inextricably linked to a "loss" of self, leads to a radically distinct view of responsibility for oneself, and for others.

Keywords

• Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, phenomenology, authenticity, responsibility, intersubjectivity, self, other