The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Necessarianism; Describing and Analyzing two Contemporary Approaches

Abstract

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) has been attacked due to its controversial results. Among these results, necessarianism (modal collapse) is the most significant one. Indeed, our intuition indicates that there are some things around us which are contingent which means that they could be in another way. Accepting the PSR seems to conflict with this common intuition; if all things have a sufficient reason, is it possible to have contingency or would all things be necessary? In response to this problem, several answers have been presented which we will recount briefly in this paper , nevertheless the main points that we have emphasized in this paper are: 1. explaining the problem of necessarianism based on the text of one of the pioneer thinkers in this regard (Van Inwagen) who refuted the principle and 2. an answer to this problem from one of the most important researchers on the issue (Pruss) who tries to solve the problem by denying causal necessity. Finally, we examine the solution of Muslim philosophers especially Ibn-Sina (Avicenna) who solved the problem without refuting causal necessity.

Keywords

• principle of sufficient reason (psr)
• necessarianism
• modal collapse
• peter van inwagen
• alexander pruss