Political Economy of Power and Governance in Afghanistan (2001–2021)

Abstract

The article deals with the emergence and transformation of the political economy of power and governance in Afghanistan after the Operation Enduring Freedom and until the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. The author uses political economy approach rooted in institutional theory, particularly its idea of fragile limited access orders. The research shows that such an order emerged in Afghanistan after 2001. Its stability and equilibrium were conditional on several factors. First, a substantial amount of financial and military aid was required to support patronage networks and administrative rent that ensured loyalty to the government. The government co-opted some powerful agents of periphery thus aiding the stability of increasingly de-centralized system that originated during the years of civil war. Ex-warlords took positions in formal administration and ensured that the periphery stayed loyal to the government in exchange for retaining their autonomy and access to administrative rent. The insurgency threat helped foster cooperation and limited predatory behavior of the system’s agents. After 2014 as a result of the partial troops withdrawal and their more limited mandate in Afghanistan, reduced foreign aid and the 2014 presidential elections crisis the factors mentioned were no longer at play supporting the equilibrium. The external support decreased; center-periphery relations turned sour amid a growing insurgency threat. This resulted in a disequilibrium, and the system collapsed which allowed the Taliban to retake power in Afghanistan in August 2021.

Keywords

• afghanistan
• taliban
• political economy
• governance
• limited access order