Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance and bond credit spreads: Evidence from China

Abstract

Using hand-collected data on purchases of D&O insurance by Chinese listed firms for the period from 2008 to 2019, we empirically find that D&O insurance negatively associates with credit spreads. The negative relationship still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests and is not driven by the eyeball effect. We also show that D&O insurance can reduce credit spreads via the channels of internal controls, external monitoring, information asymmetry and default risk. Moreover, the negative effect of D&O insurance on credit spreads is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms, those located in regions with a low level of marketization or that employ rating agencies with a bad reputation. Our study complements the literature on the credit spreads and corporate governance.

Keywords

• D&O Insurance
• Bond Credit Spreads
• Corporate Governance
• External Supervision