Does liberal democracy promote economic development? interrogating electoral cost and development trade-off in Nigeria’s fourth republic

Abstract

The popular thinking in western scholarship projects progressive deepening of liberal democratic principles and praxis as the panacea for economic prosperity in the peripheral socio-economic formation. While comparative studies on these relationships in both established and fledgling democracies have produced differential results, the link between electoral cost and economic development in transitional states is under-studied. This study therefore provides an empirical analysis of how election cost in Nigeria’s fourth republic undermines expected development returns. Using the Marxist Instrumentalist framework of analysis, documentary data and content analysis, this study argues that the electoral timetable of a four-year fixed-term of office for elected officers only serves the economic interests of the local bourgeoisies and their foreign collaborators. It diverts huge public spending from human and capital development to the procurement of election logistical materials usually sourced from the industrialised states. Thus, while the economic base of the metropolitan states and the local elite are expanding, the citizens are at the receiving end of this unfair arrangement. Consequently, the study recommends an electoral reform which prioritises a six-year single tenure system in Nigeria.

Keywords

• liberal democracy
• election cost
• metropolitan states
• economic development
• fledgling democracies
• local bourgeoisie