A Game Theoretic Framework for Power Allocation in Full-Duplex Wireless Networks

Abstract

In this paper, we apply a game theoretic approach to power allocation in full-duplex orthogonal frequency division multiple access networks. Such networks exhibit a full-duplex base station, which allocates the same radio resources to a pair of half-duplex user equipment: one on the uplink, and one on the downlink. A theoretical doubling of the capacity is threatened by the interferences generated by full-duplex operation: self-interference and intra-cell co-channel interference. In our work, we propose three non-cooperative games aimed at tackling the intricate task of allocating power to scheduled pairs of user equipment, with objectives varying from improving user equipment performance to reducing power expenditure. The games have two sets of players: the users on the uplink, and the base station on the downlink. We use a special class of games, known as super-modular games, to draft different player utilities with different objectives. Via a set of exhaustive simulations, we assess the significance of power allocation in full-duplex wireless networks and determine its gains and limitations.

Keywords

• Game theory
• full-duplex
• scheduling
• power allocation