HUME’S MITIGATED SKEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SYSTEMS OF REALITY

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that Hume’s commitment to mind-independent objects is based on two types of realism or system of realities: (a) a naïve realism based on an unjustified vulgar belief which identifies perceptions and objects, and (b) a representational realism or philosophical system of double-existence. Firstly, I emphasize that the philosophical question “Whether there be body or not” cannot be considered a full case of unmitigated skepticism, because Hume accepts a mitigated skepticism compatible with both vulgar and representational realism. Furthermore, I argue that, while the vulgar belief in bodies is based on an unjustified assent, the double-existence theory is based on both an unjustified assent and a rationally justified assent (that corrects the former). Considering all these points, I conclude that Hume’s mitigated skepticism allows and requires a belief in or supposition of continued and distinct existences, and that this must, as a practical matter, take vulgar and philosophical forms at different times.

Keywords

• Mitigated skepticism
• Double-existence theory
• Realism
• Hume