Evolutionary Game Between Local Government and Agritourism Companies in the Context of Environmental Protection

Abstract

This study selects local government and agritourism companies to study the evolutionary game of both sides in the decision-making toward environmental protection. Based on the relevant literatures and the theory of evolutionary game, it try to establish a comparatively accurate mathematical model to verify the effectiveness of the penalty policy of the damage to the environment, then, this study explores the evolutionarily stable strategy of these two parties from the dynamic way. Research results show that, (1) When the fine of the environmental damage is bigger than the cost of the government’s supervision, the agritourism companies would choose to protect the environment if the government select the strategy of supervision. (2) When the fine of the environmental damage is fewer than the cost of the government’s supervision, the agritourism companies would not choose to protect the environment whatever the government select the strategy of supervision or non-supervision. (3) When the fine of the environmental damage is bigger than the sum of the administrative costs and bonuses, the agritourism enterprises would choose the strategy of protecting the environment even the government select the strategy of non-supervision.