Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy

Abstract

Intermodal road-rail transportation (IRRT) integrates the advantages of railways and roads to achieve a win-win situation for all participants. However, the interest game problem of IRRT affects the enthusiasm of each sub-carrier to cooperate, which makes it difficult to show its advantages in the competition with the truck-only transport (TOT), and then retards the promotion process of the multimodal transport industry. In order to improve the competitiveness of IRRT, based on Stackelberg game and low-carbon policy, the interest coordination problem of supply chain composed of road transport enterprises (RTE), railway transport enterprises (RWTE) and multimodal transport operators (MTO) is studied under the background of the TOT's competition. The RESULTS SHOW THAT THE active intervention of the local government has a significant promotion effect on the profits of the RTE and the RWTE under the decentralized decision mode, while the profits of the MTO show a trend of decreasing first and then increasing.

Keywords

• carbon emissions
• game theory
• government intervention
• interest game
• IRRT supply chain