The recovery strategy of interdependent networks under targeted attacks

Abstract

To effectively mitigate failures in interdependent systems during targeted-attack scenarios, a common approach is to pre-store repair resources. The question arises: what constitutes an appropriate quantity of these pre-stored repair resources? The paper introduces a novel recovery strategy aimed at providing guidance for this issue. Current recovery strategies frequently emphasize the dynamic interplay between cascading failures and recovery processes, indicating that interventions during the recovery phase are permissible. In this context, the recovery strategy focus on recovering a predetermined number of failed nodes that are adjacent to the largest connected component of each individual network, along with their dependent nodes, at each recovery stage. Simulation results demonstrate that this strategy significantly enhances the capacity to prevent system breakdowns for interdependent networks subjected to targeted attacks. Therefore, by determining the necessary recovery steps to prevent system failures and the appropriate repair resources required for each step, this novel strategy can serve as a valuable reference for the pre-storage of repair resources. Significantly, the strategy can be effectively applied to interdependent networks associated with critical infrastructure, such as power grids and communication networks.

Keywords

• Interdependent network
• Targeted attack
• Recovery strategy