Effects of conservative-militant defection strategies on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma

Abstract

Abstract Competition in the international arena and business realm offers avenues for individual growth and advancement. Individuals using different means of competition can obtain unequal rewards. This paper claims that when no consensus is reached in business activities, defectors will choose conservative or militant defection strategies during market competition. Conservative defectors, who are in a comparatively weak position, need to pay the costs brought by market share losses. However, their personal abilities cannot be ignored, which prompts them to bravely choose the conservative defection strategy. This brings rewards to conservative defectors. Militant defectors, typically in stronger positions, also receive greater rewards. Research results establish an evolutionary game model of three strategies, the cooperation strategy, the conservative defection strategy, and the militant defection strategy. After the system is stable, this model displays two stable states. Through numerical simulation, it can be found that the personal abilities of conservative defectors play a decisive role in promoting cooperation. However, the market share losses of conservative defectors have periodical impacts on cooperation. Moreover, the threats of militant defectors to cooperation should be comprehensively considered in combination with the personal abilities of conservative defectors.