Joint detection and state estimation based on GPS spoofing attack in smart grids

Abstract

Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are widely used in power system state estimation due to its high sampling rate and real-time estimation of power state in power systems. However, it is also vulnerable to cyberattacks (GPS spoofing attacks) since it uses unencrypted GPS civil signals for synchronization. The GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs) will intentionally manipulate the time reference of PMUs, which is equivalent to falsifying the phase angle of the PMU measurements. In this paper, we consider the secure power state estimation and attacks detection with the unknown GSAs in the power systems. Particularly, we derived the PMU-based GSAs model in the power state estimation problem, which is formulated as a mixed maximum likelihood problem. In the formulated problem, the involved unknown parameters are coupled and the objective function is non-convex, which are of significant challenges in finding optimal solutions. To tackle these challenges, a joint maximum a posteriori and maximum likelihood (JMAP-ML) algorithm is proposed to securely estimate the power state and detect the GSAs in the mixed measurements of PMUs. Different testing scenarios in IEEE 14 bus system are simulated to show the proposed algorithm’ performance on GSAs detection and state estimation. Numerical examples demonstrate the improved accuracy of our algorithm compared with classical algorithms when GSAs are present. And we conclude that when a sufficient number of PMUs are deployed in the system, the impact of GSAs will be largely compensated in the estimation stage.

Keywords

• PMU
• GPS spoofing attacks
• JMAP-ML
• Detection
• State estimate