PLoS ONE (Jan 2021)
Does the board’s on-site decision inhibit over-investment
Abstract
It is an effective expansion of the research on the Board of Directors to do the research based on different board meeting forms and their effects sampling A-share companies listed in 2007–2017, the article empirically tests the impact of the times of board meetings, the proportion of on-site board meetings on listed companies’ over-investment. Consequently and significantly, the times of board meetings is positively correlated with over-investment, while the proportion of on-site board meetings is negatively correlated with over-investment. That is, the on-site meeting for the Board decision-making will better inhibit the enterprises’ over-investment behaviors. Further research shows that when there is a controlling shareholder in the company or in a dual position, the on-site board meeting no longer has a significant inhibitory effect on over-investment. By research on the independence of the Board of Directors, it is found that when selecting on-site board decision-making, the existence of independent directors has an over-investment suppression effect, and the higher the proportion of independent directors, the more obvious the inhibitory effect is. The samples are divided into state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, the study found that when choosing on-site board meetings, state-owned enterprises have a greater inhibitory effect on over-investment than private enterprises. The findings of this study will enrich the research of the board meeting and provide a new testing method for the relevant research of the Board of Directors.