Simple Abstention and Constructive Abstention in the Context of International Economic: Two Too Similar Sides of the Same Coin?

Abstract

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1121-1130 | European Forum Insight of 4 February 2023 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction: framing the problem. - II. Simple and constructive abstentions as flexibility mechanisms under CFSP. - III. Constructive abstention and international economic sanctions: constructive abstention as limited to the CFSP act... - IV. ... and constructive abstention applying to TFEU regulations. - V. Constructive abstention and the duty of loyal cooperation: too a heavy burden in the context of sanctions? - VI. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) Constructive abstention, provided for in art. 31(2) TEU, has been conceived of as an instrument applicable to CFSP acts. As art. 215 TFEU establishes an integrated regime in which CFSP decisions and TFEU regulations are interdependent on each other, the issue arises as to whether the scope of constructive abstention can be extended to cover not only the CFSP decision but also its implementing regulation. This Insight argues that constructive abstention should apply not only to the CFSP act, but also to the regulation. In turn, this conclusion calls for reflection on the scope and consequences of the duty of loyal cooperation in the context of restrictive measures and, more generally, on the effectiveness of constructive abstention in this field.

Keywords

• article 31(2) teu
• article 215 tfeu
• restrictive measures
• constructive abstention
• cfsp
• duty of loyal cooperation