An Evolutionary Game Study of the Behavioral Management of Bid Evaluations in Reserve Auctions

Abstract

Winner determination in current auctions is often performed separately by two groups: the technical expert group and the business expert group. In general, there is a strong negative correlation between technical and business attributes, and it will cause antagonistic feelings and noncooperative behaviors between the two groups under the premise of bounded rationality. First, this paper constructs a game model between the management department and experts and analyzes the conditions for achieving stable equilibrium solutions. Then, we analyze the evolutionary paths and the influencing factors of relevant behaviors based on evolutionary game theory, which reveals the influence from the individual to groups. Finally, to systematically and quantitatively study bid evaluation behaviors, a simulation system based on MATLAB GUI shows the influences on the evolutionary results as the initial conditions and decision parameters change. The study makes positive contributions to the management of bidding evaluations to improve the fairness of the bid evaluation mechanism.

Keywords

• Grouped bid evaluation
• evolutionary game theory
• behavioral analysis
• numerical simulation