An Exploration of Metaphysical Grounding and Divine Command Theory

Abstract

The concept of metaphysical grounding refers to a dependence relation—a relation between facts that is asymmetrical and non-causal. I aim to apply this concept to a Divine Command Theory (DCT) of moral obligations. Divine command theorists say that moral obligations arise from God’s commands. I argue that the three main views on the relation between the divine command and the obligation—causal, supervenience, and identity—do not capture all that we desire in a moral theory of obligations. After attempting to clarify metaphysical grounding in general, I articulate the distinction between what I call normative grounding and metaethical grounding. I then use this distinction to criticize Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s discussion of DCT and to highlight the compatibility of DCT with other ethical theories.

Keywords

• metaphysical grounding
• divine command theory
• moral obligation
• dependence
• relation