Concealment and Disclosure: The Cholera Crisis of 1969–70 in Korea

Abstract

The anti-cholera measures of 1969–70 represent one of the most unsuccessful quarantine cases in modern Korea. The military government, which overthrew the democratic government in 1961, tried to amend the Constitution aiming for a long-term seizure of power, and had to overcome the cholera crisis of 1969–70. Previous scholarship has emphasized the limitation of the state power when it came to controlling the cholera epidemic or the poor sanitation system of 1969–70. However, it is undeniable that the military government did have organizations, facilities, and human capital available. When a cholera epidemic broke out in 1963–64, the military government defended its people against cholera as part of the Revolutionary Tasks. Furthermore, it took counsel from a team of medical professionals knowledgeable in microbiology. In 1969, the possibility of bacteriological warfare by North Korea emerged while the government responded to cholera. To avoid this crisis, Park Chŏng-hŭi’s military government, which had been preparing for longterm rule, had to provide successful model in the cholera defense. For the military government, the concealment and distortion of infectious disease information was inevitable. Many other medical professionals trusted the activities of international organizations more than they did the government bodies, and the media accused the government of fabricating cholera death statistics. As the government failed to prevent the cholera crisis, it tightened its secrecy by concealing facts and controlling information.

Keywords

• cholera epidemic
• park chŏng-hŭi’s military government
• medical professional groups
• the politicization of preventive administration
• bacteriological warfare
• korea