Double jeopardy: FCPA enforcement and MNC risk-mitigation strategies

Abstract

Abstract Does transnational anti-bribery enforcement affect the risk-mitigation strategies of firms? This paper uses an original dataset on the enforcement actions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to examine the law’s impact on corporate behavior and political risks for multinational corporations (MNCs). I argue that corrupt institutions are not necessarily undesirable for foreign investors. Foreign firms seek above-normal returns in high-risk markets through informal exchanges with the host government. FCPA enforcement provides a “fire alarm” that affects firms differently given their sensitivity to corruption concerns. FCPA enforcement has unequal deterrence against corporate misconduct, encouraging some firms to adopt transparency norms while incentivizing other firms to be more insidious in their corrupt business practices. I use a partial observability bivariate probit model to estimate the unobservable propensity of firms to engage in corrupt exchanges. Then I examine the impact of FCPA enforcement on Chinese FDI, and find that Chinese investments are deterred from markets with robust legal institutions. The FCPA’s deterrence effects against corrupt competitors is a positive outcome for U.S. MNCs. However, American companies experience diminished returns in countries with strong investor protection regimes. External legal interventions under the FCPA generate regulatory burdens on U.S. that limit their business opportunities.

Keywords

• Transnational anti-corruption
• Political risks
• Foreign direct investment
• Rule of law
• US-China competition