The charge‐discharge compensation pricing strategy of electric vehicle aggregator considering users response willingness from the perspective of Stackelberg game

Abstract

Abstract With the rapid increase of electric vehicle (EV) ownership, the impact of EV charging load on the power grid is becoming more and more prominent. To reasonably guide EV charging/discharging to participate in Demand Response (DR) and help the power grid achieve peak cutting and valley filling, the charge‐discharge compensation pricing strategy of EV Aggregator (EVA) considering user response willingness from the perspective of Stackelberg game is proposed. Firstly, EVA, as the leader, provides charge‐discharge compensation price, to maximise its income within a day, taking into account user satisfaction constraints. Secondly, a user response willingness model is established. User engagement is used to describe the change in the number of EV responses with the change of the charge‐discharge compensation price by EVA and select the random EV set that accepts EVA charge‐discharge guidance. Finally, EV, as a follower, conducts charging/discharging behaviour to minimise the charging cost. By using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) condition, strong duality theory and iterative method, the strategy equilibrium solution is solved. The results show that considering the user response willingness can effectively reduce the decision risk when EVA participates in bidding. Although EVA income slightly decreases considering the response willingness, the average user satisfaction increases by 0.1.

Keywords

• decision making
• demand side management
• electric vehicles
• game theory
• power grids
• pricing