Pharos Journal of Theology (Aug 2020)
Animals or Not-Animals? Reflections on a Postliberal View of the Move from Particularity to Unsubstitutability
Abstract
‘Humans are not animals!’ This seemingly rudimentary claim has had catastrophic results; setting humanity in opposition to creation and to itself. It has resulted in the ruthless persecution of those who are seen to be ‘sub-human’ or merely ‘potential humans.’ Such ‘not-animal’1 methodologies attempt to identify a limited set of features as the distinctive human characteristic. In Abrahamic traditions, particularly Christianity, the descriptive phrase imago Dei (Image of God) has acted as the placeholder for these anthropological distinctive features. Acting with both categorical and evaluative force, this enigmatic phrase has been more of a problem than a solution. Distinction methodologies often appeal to non-physical features. Consequently, they have proved inadequate at providing a viable basis for universal human classification and unqualified value. The emphasis on human radical distinction has come under criticism, particularly from Yale Divinity School and David Kelsey’s Eccentric Existence (2009). Such a postliberalist approach argues for a shift of emphasis away from human distinctiveness to human unsubstitutability before God. The advantages are clear; humans are one with creation and all created equal. The disadvantages are startling, most notably the loss of humanity itself and, consequently, the loss of the very notion of human value. This paper will explore these disadvantages, critique this shifting focus and offer four theological desiderata to which proposed answers to the conundrum of human distinction and value should adhere.
