The Moderating Effect of Managers' Ability on the Relationship between Tax Avoidance and Firm Value in the Framework of Agency Problems

Abstract

This research aims to develop a model presented by Park et al. (2015). By studying data from 112 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange for nine years ending on 20 March 2021, the new model was tested using the panel regression method. The results show that when the conflict of interests is small, more capable managers will take advantage of the tax avoidance phenomenon in the direction of shareholders’ interests more effectively. According to the results of this research, it can be stated that value creation for shareholders depends on the ability of managers and the conflict of interests between the managers and the owners. This research tries to resolve the shortcomings of the former research in investigating the role of managers’ ability by presenting a new model and enriching the background in this field. Thus, the present study about the conflict of interests between the manager and the owner presents a comprehensive model to investigate the role of managers’ ability. In this research, the role of managers’ ability according to the conflict of interests between the manager and the owner, in the utilization of tax avoidance is particularly considered and modeled to create value for shareholders

Keywords

• managers’ ability
• agency problems
• tax avoidance
• value creation