Individualization in Online Markets: A Generalized Model of Price Discrimination through Learning

Abstract

This paper builds a theoretical framework to model individualization in online markets. In a market with consumers of varying levels of demand, a seller offers multiple product bundles and prices. Relative to brick-and-mortar stores, an online seller can use pricing algorithms that can observe a buyer’s online behavior and infer a buyer’s type. I build a generalized model of price discrimination with Bayesian learning where a seller offers different bundles of the product that are sized and priced contingent on the posterior probability that the consumer is of a given type. Bayesian learning allows the seller to individualize product menus over time as new information becomes available. I explain how this strategy differs from first- or second-degree price discrimination models and how Bayesian learning over time affects equilibrium values and welfare.

Keywords

• price discrimination
• Bayesian inference
• Bayesian learning
• algorithmic pricing
• individualization