Bilateral aid to Tajikistan; donor tactics and responses to troubled governance

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe amount and form of aid distributed to foreign countries may depend on the contexts and characteristics of the recipient countries. Donors who have aid relations with poorly governed countries, while emphasizing good governance, may have to adjust aid tools to circumvent weak institutional environments. In keeping with the literature on aid in contexts of weak governance, the paper analyses donors’ strategies in Tajikistan – an understudied country with geostrategic importance to traditional donors – showing how bilateral donors provided controlled aid. Donors disbursed aid mainly in the form of projects, a highly controllable aid type. Donors, while clearly interested in Tajik governance, appeared to sidestep politically sensitive areas probably fearing uncalled-for diplomatic frictions with the Tajik leadership. Nonetheless, donors did touch on some politically sensitive issues via non-state channels, enabling them to avoid direct interactions with Tajik authorities. Operating in poorly governed countries can be complicated for bilateral donors: they are accountable to their domestic taxpayers; they have to devise sophisticated aid strategies to achieve aid efficacy, especially in countries also deemed strategically important; and they cannot risk compromising bilateral relations.

Keywords

• Aid capture
• corruption
• foreign aid
• governance
• Tajikistan