Mitigating Market Power and Promoting Competition in Electricity Markets through a Preventive Approach: The Role of Forward Contracts

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel approach to optimizing the structure of the electricity market by mitigating market power through the use of forward contracts. The IEEE 30 node test system is used as a case study for the paper, which employs nodal pricing and a Cournot model with recursive optimization. The findings show that forward contracts can reduce market power and lead to a more competitive market structure with fewer participants. The study emphasizes the importance of successor companies having a well-balanced mix of generation technology. Six players with a different generational mix are optimal in the constrained nodal pricing scenario, while five players with slightly different mixes are optimal in the Cournot case study. These findings have important implications for policymakers and industry stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of efficient electricity markets. Market power can be reduced by using forward contracts and establishing an appropriate number of market participants, resulting in more efficient and sustainable electricity markets. Overall, this study provides useful insights for improving electricity market structures and increasing competition in the electricity sector.

Keywords

• forward contract
• nodal pricing
• Cournot
• market power
• market structure