Towards Attack and Defense Views of Rational Delegation of Computation

Abstract

Rational delegation of computation is an important technology of mobile Internet at present, which is significant to the construction of intelligent urban computing. In order to close to practical applications, many tasks need cooperation with edge computing and cloud computing. The delegated computation scheme with rational players guarantees the reliability of the calculation results by the utility function. This paper studies the rational delegation of computation and the security attack-defense from attack and defense. Combining with the concept of average mutual information in information theory, this paper presents the attack and defense model for rationally delegating the computation. The main method of modeling is to convert the attack or defense of rationally delegated computation into communication problems in information theory and construct the attack channel and defense channel for the client and the calculator respectively. The channel capacity of the attack channel represents the attack capacity limitation of the adversary in the delegated computing environment, and that of the defense channel denotes the defense capacity limitation of clients in the delegated computation. Then, we discuss the relationship between attack limitation and defense limitation, and it shows that there are different strengths and weaknesses between the calculator and the client under different mixed strategies. Finally, the numerical analysis of experiments demonstrates that the optimal strategy of attack and defense is the strategy when the game between client and calculator reaches the equilibrium point.

Keywords

• Rational delegation computation
• mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
• channel capacity
• capacity limitation of attack and defense