Tying the successor’s hands or following the neighbor? Diffusion of access to information in Brazilian municipalities

Abstract

Abstract Why do political actors promote public transparency? Studies show that adherence to transparency can be both politically strategic, i.e., to tie the hands of the successor, and a result of observing the adoption of the policy made by other municipalities, i.e., to minimize the cost of information. We test both the political and the informational motivations to explain the adoption of transparency laws with a subnational analysis of the diffusion of LAI in Brazilian municipalities (2011-2019). Results show that both the informational and the political strategy motivations affect the probability of adopting the LAI. Socioeconomic factors are also important explanatory factors. However, an analysis of heterogeneous effects shows that the learning mechanism is relevant for reducing the impact of socioeconomic factors. This means that learning from neighboring municipalities minimizes the cost of information and the reliance on structural factors to promote transparency at the local level.

Keywords

• transparency
• access to information
• diffusion
• election
• municipalities