حکمت سینوی (Feb 2022)
The Essential Identity of the Cognitive Form and External Known in Avicenna's Works
Abstract
In some of his important works, Avicenna has considered the nature of cognition as receiving the "known form". The expression of "known form" contains fundamental ambiguity and is formulated in the form of two main rival views in Islamic philosophy; the first is what can be called as "Essential identity of Cognitive form and External Known-Theory of Cognition" and the second as "Phantasm (Shabah) theory of cognition". By focusing on Avicenna' own works, it is not easy to judge these two rival theories. The problems here are raised mainly from two sources: firstly from incompatibility and inconsistency of Avicenna's declarations in his different works and secondly from non-acceptable logical consequences of each theory, at least at the first encounter. Because it's impossible to examine the pro and cons of both theories at one paper. So, here I focus just on the evidence of first theory: Essential identity of Cognitive form and External Known-Theory of Cognition and based on the two evidence of textual and meta textual, we have shown there are important evidences in Avicenna's works collection that indicate he does not mean the word of "form (Surat)" in the expression of "the known form (Surat al-Modrak)" such as the meaning of "phantasm" in literal sense; but as he states in Ishȃrȃt, his means is "the real of entity (Ḥaqiqat al She'y) " or "what is in virtue of which everything is entity that is"; not the phantasm.
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