A tripartite evolutionary game analysis on China’s waste incineration projects from the perspective of responsible innovation

Abstract

In the process of China’s energy transition, responsible innovation is essential to promote the sustainable development of energy projects. To explore the mechanism of multi-agent​ strategy in responsible innovation, taking waste incineration power projects in China as an example, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, waste incineration power firms and the surrounding public is constructed, the strategy interaction of stakeholders is analyzed and the corresponding evolution process is simulated. The findings are as follows: (1) Increasing punishment and the social and environmental benefits and the value compensation of negative externality, and decreasing the cost are conductive to make the dynamic system into evolutionarily stable strategy (1,1,1). (2) No matter how much the probability of choosing three strategies, the dynamic system will evolve into evolutionarily stable strategy (1,1,1) and have 8 strategy combination. (3) As an incentive mechanism of government, the higher subsidies and the value compensation of negative externality, the higher probability the waste incineration power generation firms and the surrounding public choosing positive strategy. The research results can be used as a reference for the government to improve incentive measures and provided with decision-making for stakeholders in responsible innovation to adjust their strategies.

Keywords

• China’s waste incineration power projects
• Responsible innovation
• Tripartite evolutionary game model
• Decision-making behavior