La passivité de la logique

Abstract

What is the path in Husserl that takes us from formal to transcendental logic? Does it follow Kant’s course from “general logic” to “transcendental logic”, or does the mathematical character of modern logic divest it of the possibility of serving as a “transcendental clue”? In this paper it is argued that for Husserl mathematical logic can in fact provide a clue, in light of a reflection on what can be called an inverse relationship between passivity and logic. There is for Husserl both a logic of passivity and a passivity of logic: the passive is itself synthetic, and as such determinative of form; and logic is itself, as a body of knowledge, saturated with a passivity that secures its sense and validity as a logic. Where the two cross, where the one governs the constitutive force of the other and vice versa, is where the guiding clue can be found for the elaboration of the possibility of a transcendental logic from out of a reflection on formal mathematical logic.

Keywords

• Husserl
• logic
• passivity
• transcendental philosophy
• Kant
• Aristotle