Farmeconomia: Health Economics and Therapeutic Pathways (Jun 2002)
Incentivi ai farmaci generici a livello di ASL: l’osservatorio I.H.A.G.O.
Abstract
Generic drugs are pharmaceutical products that contain an active substance whose patent-covered period expired and are marketed with the name of the molecule. The public health authorities of most EU countries agree on the importance of generic drugs in rationalising the pharmaceutical market, particularly by favouring reasonable pricing of “mature” products. In contrast with this wide consensus, the market share of generic drugs remains quite poor in Italy, despite recent regulatory incentives for the promotion of their use. The longlasting lack of specific laws - reference-price politics were introduced only in 2001- and the unusually long patent-covered period fixed by the past legislation are among the main reasons for the scarce utilisation of generics in Italy. The awareness of the importance of promoting initiatives conducted on a local (ASL), and not only national (SSN) scale conducted to the I.H.A.G.O. project, an observatory on the diffusion of generics in several local health districts. The project analyses the impact, in terms of market share, of local promoting activities (investigated by means of questionnaires) conducted during the year 2001 in 11 ASLs (local health districts), deliberately selected among the most active in terms of promotion of the use of generics. The I.H.A.G.O. observation revealed several praiseworthy promotional efforts, particularly of informative and cultural kind, conducted by some of the considered ASLs. Unfortunately, these measures seem not to have had a practical impact on the generics market in the observed districts: the market share increase was superior to the one observed on national scale only in 4 of the considered ASLs, in other 4 it was similar, and in the remaining 3 it resulted even inferior. It appears useful to plan further measures to support the diffusion of generics, maybe by motivating health operators to their prescription with the introduction of “prize/punishment” mechanisms.