Attack on Kayawood protocol: uncloaking private keys

Abstract

We analyze security properties of a two-party key-agreement protocol recently proposed by I. Anshel, D. Atkins, D. Goldfeld, and P. Gunnels, called Kayawood protocol. At the core of the protocol is an action (called E-multiplication) of a braid group on some finite set. The protocol assigns a secret element of a braid group to each party (private key). To disguise those elements, the protocol uses a so-called cloaking method that multiplies private keys on the left and on the right by specially designed elements (stabilizers for E-multiplication).

Keywords

• kayawood protocol
• group-based cryptography
• key agreement
• algebraic eraser
• braid group
• colored burau presentation
• e-multiplication
• cloaking problem
• 94a60
• 68w30