The Von Neumann–Morgenstern Curve and Bank Capital Adequacy Penalties—An Empirical Analysis

Abstract

The risk of lending money collected from savers is that it leaves banks liable to default with depositors if events (and hence repayment demands) become ‘abnormal’. Even though international and national regulation has been introduced to ensure that a certain level of capital is retained by banks, such regulation can be subverted. The current system of international regulation based on the Basel III agreements does not stipulate a standardised approach for inspection frequency or penalty magnitude. This leaves the potential for regulatory arbitrage. The scientific value of an analysis to optimise regulatory efficiency and reduce such arbitrage is therefore considerable. This work therefore assesses the results of the empirical testing of a model based on the Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function and consequently proposes that this model be used as a basis for standardising capital adequacy limit infraction penalties on an international level to prevent regulatory arbitrage. A survey is undertaken in order to test the responses of participants on the level of penalty which would deter them from regulatory transgression under different theorised levels of profit and probability of discovery. Based on the responses of two distinct subject groups (‘bankers’ and ‘non-bankers’) in different scenarios of hypothetical capital adequacy violation, the Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function is reviewed against empirical results and revealed to show a semi-strong correlation. Lastly, the analysis reveals the striking similarities of the two groups’ responses, posing regulatory implications for the industry.

Keywords

• Von Neumann–Morgenstern curve
• banks
• capital adequacy
• Basel III
• regulatory arbitrage
• expected utility theory