L’argumentation dans les recours en révision au Grand Conseil de Malines : une distinction estompée entre « fait » et « droit » ?

Abstract

The sixteenth-century procedural remedy of review (revisio, révision, revisie) against judgments of the Great Council of Mechlin was deemed to be open only when a party challenged the judges’ findings on facts, claiming that the decision was based on an erroneous assessment of the facts of the case. Nevertheless, the records show that in review proceedings, it was not unusual for counsel to justify the review with arguments based on legal principles. A closer analysis of those cases suggests that such legal arguments referred mainly to authorities which civil law doctrines regarded as iura propria, i. e. customary law and statute law. In procedural terms, therefore, particular law authorities occupied a middle ground between facts in a strict sense and ius commune authorities.

Keywords

• Great Council of Mechlin
• review (revision) proceedings
• error in the findings on facts
• iura propria
• ius commune