A raison d'être for the judicial process

Abstract

Several Spanish authors have conceptualised the judicial process as a forced and inevitable temporal evolution that must precede the resolution of the controversy and that depends on slowness —as the antithesis of immediacy—. According to this doctrine, this process aims to avoid an immediate judicial response. In this paper, I will examine why the judicial process has been defined in this way; the reasons why speed is not desirable in the judicial function. To this end, I draw on the findings of cognitive psychology and, more specifically, on a set of theories that support the existence of two ways of processing information —two ways of knowing, believing, thinking, reasoning, and acting—: one fast and one slow; these are the dual processing theories. As a result of this confrontation, I propose a rationale, a purpose, and a definition for the judicial process, which are based on the idea that the presence of a time interval is necessary for the right to judicial impartiality and the right of defence to —materially— exist.

Keywords

• judicial process
• right of defence
• procedural guarantees
• judicial impartiality
• jurisdiccional function