Faṣlnāmah-i Pizhūhish-i Huqūq-i ̒Umūmī (Nov 2013)
The Concept of ‘Third Generation Rights’
Abstract
Recent developments of concept and instances of rights have given rise tomany chanllenges among legal theorists, each of them has attempted totackle the challenges in his/her particular way. It is claimed that in orderfor us to have a better life it is no longer possible to merely rely on thefirst and second generations of rights. It is, necessary to (generate orestablish) another generation of rights that is commensurate withrequirments of the collective life. This necessity has been the basis onwhich the idea of third generation rights has been established. Now, inorder to deal with claims under third generation rights – which are alsocalled group, collective or peoples – we are, first, required to put forth aclear undeatanding of the concept of third generation rights. It is, then,essential to deal with theoretical foundations of these rights. In thisregard, we endeavour to answer certain fundamental questions on theserights: what does third generation rights mean? What are their instances?Are we allowed to use the title of ‘rights’ for claims made undercollective life per se? What are the arguments of proponents of this kindof rights? Are the arguments tenable? If not, what is the altertanativeanalysis?
